

Investigation name:	<b>Operation Richenda</b>
IOPC reference:	<b>2019/128705 and 2019/128689</b>

## > Summary of IOPC conclusions

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A summary of our conclusions and our rationale is set out below.

### > Metropolitan Police Service and City of London Police – Death or Serious Injury investigation

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**We found no indication that a person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying the bringing of disciplinary proceedings by using force that was unnecessary, disproportionate or unreasonable in the circumstances.**

#### > Performance

The investigation report sets out the actions taken by the Metropolitan Police and City of London Police in the fatal shooting of Mr Usman Khan on 29 November 2019.

We considered:

- (i) whether or not the performance of any person serving with the police was unsatisfactory; and
- (ii) what actions, (if any) it proposes to take in respect of their performance

In our opinion the Metropolitan Police Service and City of London Police are **not** required to make those determinations because we are satisfied that the report does not raise any performance issues.

#### > Deployment of Taser

We agreed with the analysis outlined in the investigation report relating to the use of Taser by an officer. The evidence suggests that, in the very short space of time, the officer had to consider options to incapacitate Mr Khan, and either did not know or did not have time to fully consider the risks of him wearing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) before discharging the Taser.

We advised that the officer may benefit from a reminder about the risk of Taser use when there is a suspected IED.

### > Use of lethal force

We are of the opinion that the evidence strongly supports:

- that officers had no other reasonable option but to shoot Mr Khan to immediately incapacitate him
- the officers' accounts that they stopped shooting once Mr Khan had stopped moving and therefore no longer presented a threat to life
- that officers did only what they honestly and instinctively thought was necessary for the legitimate purpose of their own defence and to prevent crimes being committed against others

### > Summary of rationale

We viewed the council CCTV, National Police Air Service footage and some of the extracts of the body-worn video. The evidence strongly supports that officers who used force against Mr Khan genuinely and reasonably believed the following:

- He posed an imminent threat to life.
- He was wearing what they believed to be a viable IED which he could detonate at any time.

The evidence strongly supports that:

- officers were aware Mr Khan had just inflicted very serious violence on members of the public in Fishmonger's Hall
- the officers and members of the public were well within what could be considered a safe cordon distance according to the training they had received

### > Organisational Learning

Throughout this investigation, we carefully considered whether there were any opportunities for learning or improvement. We make learning recommendations to improve policing and public confidence in the police complaints system and to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents

In February 2020, we attended a meeting with the senior leadership team for National Police Chiefs' Council armed policing. As a result of that meeting, the following occurred:

- Revisions were made to the Authorised Professional Practice for armed policing, including some additional emphasis in the critical shot content regarding the

distinction between a critical shot (as a concept or use of force) and the relationship between that type of shot and command authority. This was to reinforce the point that authority for a critical shot is only required in specific circumstances.

- A training package for delivery to all Authorised Firearm Officers was developed, focused on Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices and the associated considerations, challenges, and options. It also explained the issue around when a critical shot should be authorised.
- The annual firearms command and tactical advisor package was finalised. This package is given to forces for mandatory delivery to all levels of command and TAs during the training year. This package also reinforces the critical shot issue from the command perspective.

As a result of the above, we did not consider it necessary to issue learning recommendations in relation to these areas. We invited the views of the Metropolitan Police Service and City of London Police on whether current guidance and training in relation to Taser use with a suspected IED is sufficient.

A debrief involving the key police witnesses in this case also took place. Learning points were identified and are being addressed by both forces.